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A

LEGAL AND EMPIICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SYSTEM IN

ACTION IN THE LOS ANGELES MUNICIPAL COURT
(CENTRAL DIVISION)
BRUCE ZUCKER"

I.

INTRODUCTION

In order to evict a tenant from his or her rental unit in California, a
landlord must file a lawsuit, called an unlawful detainer action,' seeking

court sanctioned possession and restitution of the subject premises. Landlords may not use force, intimidation, reduction of services, 2 or any other
Assistant Professor, Department of Business Law, California State University,
Northridge. J.D., 1993, Loyola Law School; B.A., 1989, University of California, Los Angeles. Professor Zucker is a former staff attorney with the Eviction Defense Center of the Legal
Aid Foundation of Los Angeles and is currently Directing Attorney of the California State
University, Northridge Tenant Legal Clinic. The author gratefully thanks Dr. William
Jennings, Department of Finance, Real Estate and Insurance (Chair), California State University, Northridge, and Cecile Eder, B.S. candidate (Accountancy), May 1999, for their dedicated assistance with the research, writing, and analysis for this Article.
Research for this Article was made possible by a grant from the Office of Research and Sponsored Projects, California State University, Northridge.
1. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1161, 1161a. (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
2. California Civil Code section 789.3 states, in pertinent part:
(a) A landlord shall not with intent to terminate the occupancy under any lease or
other tenancy or estate at will, however created, of property used by a tenant as his
residence willfully cause, directly or indirectly, the interruption or termination of
any utility service furnished the tenant, including, but not limited to, water, heat,
light, electricity, gas, telephone, elevator, or refrigeration, whether or not the utility
service is under the control of the landlord.
(b) In addition, a landlord shall not, with intent to terminate the occupancy under
any lease or other tenancy or estate at will, however created, of property used by a
tenant as his or her residence, willfully:
(1) Prevent the tenant from gaining reasonable access to the property by changing
the locks or using a bootlock or by any other similar method or device; (2) Remove outside doors or windows; or (3) Remove from the premises the tenant's
personal property, the furnishings, or any other items without the prior written
consent of the tenant ....
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"self-help" tactics3 to influence a tenant into vacating his or her rental unit in
lieu of following the court process.4 However, landlords usually wish to get a
tenant out of the rental unit as quickly as possible because tenants are often
"indigent, judgment-proof' and render "an award of damages of rent [to] be
meaningless."5
The unlawful detainer system was designed to be an expedited action,
permitting a landlord to legally regain possession in a matter of a few
weeks,6 thereby reducing the amount of lost rents and lost profits. Unlawful
detainer actions have priority over virtually all other pending actions (except
criminal cases) and usually are set for trial within twenty days of the filing of
the Memorandum to Set Case For Trial.7
In consideration of the short time frame involved, the proceedings are
restricted as to the questions that may be addressed and the subject matter
that may be litigated.8 The landlord must categorically comply with the
statutory notice terms9 because the defendant's procedural rights are very reAny violation of this section may result in an award to the aggrieved tenant of actual damages, $100 per day for each day of violation ($250 minimum per cause of action), attorneys
fees, and/or injunctive relief during the pendency of the action. CAL. CEV. CODE § 789.3(c)
(West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
Although this statute only applies to residential tenancies, nothing limits its application to
temporary or occasional residences. See Otanez v. Blue Skies Mobile Home Park, 1 Cal. App.
4th 1521, 1525, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210, 212 (1991).
3. At common law, landlords were permitted to resort to "self-help" in order to regain
possession of the rental unit, e.g., lockout. See Daluiso v. Boone, 71 Cal. 2d 484, 495, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 707, 714 (1969); Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597, 605, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488, 492 (1961).
4. A tenant (including month-to-month) has a property interest in his or her rental unit.
At common law, a lease was considered to be a "transfer of possession of specific property
for a temporal period or at will." ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND
TENANT 1 (1980). However, modern application has also considered a lease as a bilateral
contract. Id
5. MYRONMOSKovrrz, CALIFORNIAEVICrION DEFENSE MANUAL § 1.2(1998).
6. See id at 411.
7. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1179a (West 1982 & Supp. 1998). "In all proceedings
brought to recover the possession of real property pursuant to [the forcible entry and detainer
chapter], all courts... shall give such actions precedence over all other civil actions ... to the
end that all such actions shall be quickly heard and determined." IdL
All of the pre-trial processes have shorter time periods, including a motion to quash service of
summons, motion for summary judgment, time to respond to service of the summons and
complaint, and the setting of depositions. Even those processes that do not expressly have
shorter time frames are subject to the issuance of an order shortening time, such as a motion
to compel responses to interrogatories, production of documents, continuances, and service of
subpoenas.
8. For example, the court may not ordinarily hear title disputes as part of the unlawful
detainer trial. See Yuba River Sand Co. v. Marysville, 78 Cal. App. 2d 421, 425, 177 P.2d
642, 645 (1947). The court may not entertain a cross-complaint or counterclaim, at least while
possession is still at issue. See Vasey v. California Dance Co., 70 Cal. App. 3d 742, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 72 (1977). Collateral estoppel is limited in its application stemming from issues in unlawful detainer actions. See generally Landeros v. Pankey, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1167 (1995).
9. See generally De La Vara v. Municipal Court, 98 Cal. App. 3d 638, 159 Cal. Rptr. 648
(1997); Childs v. Eltinge, 29 Cal. App. 2d 843, 105 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1973).
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stricted. 0 Failure to do so will result in a judgment in favor of the tenant."
Even though the defendant is limited as to the defenses that he may raise
to the unlawful detainer, courts have nonetheless increasingly allowed tenants to employ them. For example, the California Supreme Court recognized
the implied warranty of habitability as a defense to the tenant's failure to pay
rent.12 Should the tenant prove that the landlord breached the implied warranty during the unlawful detainer action, the court must award judgment in
favor of the tenant and deny possession to the landlord. 3 In addition, tenants
may raise various other defenses to the landlord's unlawful detainer complaint, including retaliation, 4 inadequate or improper service of notice,"s rent
control issues, 6 landlord's bad faith, 7 waiver,"5 estoppel, 9 as well as other
equitable defenses.
Even though tenants' rights in unlawful detainer actions are limited,
some have notoriously managed to abuse the unlawful detainer system in
their favor by frivolously invoking the habitability defense or other proce10. See generally S.P. Growers Ass'n v. Rodriguez, 17 Cal. 3d 719, 131 Cal. Rptr. 761
(1976). "The starting point in evaluating the proposed defense is the general rule that because
unlawful detainer action is a summary designed to facilitate owners in obtaining possession of
their real property, counterclaims, cross-complaints, and affirmative defenses are [generally]
inadmissible." Id. at 723.
11. See id
12. See Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
13. See id. at 631-37. See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1174.2 (West 1982 & Supp.
1998).
14. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1942.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998). "If a lessor retaliates
against the lessee because of the exercise by the lessee of his rights under [California Civil
Code section 1940 et seq.] or because of his complaint to an appropriate agency as to tenantability of a dwelling, and if the lessee of a dwelling is not in default as to the payment of
his rent, the lessor may not recover possession of a dwelling in any action or proceeding,
cause the lessee to quit involuntarily, increase the rent, or decrease any services within 180
days." Id
15. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998). In most instances, an
unlawful detainer action is predicated upon an adequately constructed and served notice to
quit. For a discussion of notices in unlawful detainer actions, see Bruce Zucker, Action Depends on Adequacy of the Notice to Quit, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 19, 1998, at 8.
16. Many rent-control laws and regulations of the various California municipalities require '"just cause" to evict tenants, and impose unique eviction requirements. See TERRY B.
FRIEDMAN, CALIFORNIA PRACrICE GUIDE-LANDLORD-TENANT § 5:1 (1997).
17. See Strom v. Union Oil Company, 88 Cal. App. 2d 78, 198 P.2d 347 (1948) (holding
where landlord was intentionally elusive and sought to induce tenant into forfeiture of lease
by unfairly refusing rent, landlord failed to sustain cause of action in unlawful detainer).
18. See EDC Associates v. Gutierrez, 153 Cal. App. 3d 167, 200 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1984)
(holding where landlord knowingly accepts payment of rent from tenant after tenant's alleged
breach of lease occurs, landlord waives right to seek forfeiture of the tenancy).
19. See Salton Community Services v. Southard, 256 Cal. App. 2d 526, 531, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 246 (1967) ("[W]here a lessor, by conduct subsequent to execution of the lease, leads a
lessee to believe strict compliance with a covenant will not be required and the latter acts accordingly to his detriment, the lessor will be estopped to assert a failure to comply as a ground
for forfeiture.").
20. See Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 620 (stating tenant may plead as defense to an action in
unlawful detainer that the landlord breached the implied warranty of habitability).
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dural devices as delay tactics. 2' One tenant actually managed to stay in possession of his rental unit for a ten-month period by filing a series of pre- and
post-trial motions at a cost of over $20,000 to the landlord.'
Following the advent of these defenses, tenants increasingly raised them
in their answers to the eviction suit Not only did tenants increase the procedural defenses to the actions, but they also availed themselves of the bankruptcy process, causing further delays to eviction.'
As a result of this increase in procedural defenses, the unlawful detainer
system, which was originally designed to be a speedy mechanism for landlords to recover possession of their rental units, became very cumbersome
and time-consuming. California landlords have complained that the law "has
gone too far" with safeguarding a tenant's right to remain in possession of
his rental unit, resulting in a severe slow-down of the summary eviction
system.24 What used to take less than a month started to take several months,
or sometimes even longer. Landlords increasingly lost millions of dollars
each year as a result.'
Landlords and their interest groups have lobbied for a faster eviction
system that reduces the amount of lost rents and other related legal costs. 6
Although the problem is perceived to be particularly troublesome in California, other states and their landlord lobbies have voiced similar concerns with
delays in the eviction process.'
The California Legislature responded to this perceived slow-down of the
unlawful detainer system with the creation of a new and different eviction
system. This new system became known as a 'Test" or "Pilot Project," implemented in select California courts, including Los Angeles. On March 3,
1994, Senator Kopp introduced Senate Bill 690. This Bill passed through
the Assembly and Senate, was signed by Governor Wilson on September 26,
1994, and was codified into law effective July 1, 1996, as California Code of
21. For a discussion and illustration of this problem, see Stephanie O'Neill, Tenantsfrom
Hell: ProfessionalDeadbeats, "PetitionMill" Scam Artists Imperil Small Rental Property
Owners UnfortunateEnough to Select Them as Renters, L.A. TMES, Aug. 8, 1993, at K1.

Each year, landlords statewide lost at least $338 million to renters who refuse to
pay, according to the 1991 Unlawful Detainer Study, sponsored by the California
Apartment Law Information Foundation. While some of the losses stem from valid
tenant gripes, most are believed to be the result of unwarranted claims of renters
who choose, for whatever reason, not to pay.

Id.
22. See id.

23. See id.
24. Randy G. Gerchick, Comment, No Easy Way Out: Making the Summary Eviction
Process a Fairerand More Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L. REV.

759, 766 (1994).
25. See Cal. S.B. 690 § 1(b), 1995-1996 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kopp 1994).
26. See Gerchick, supranote 24, at 765.
27. See id at 765 n.19.
28, Cal. S.B. 690, 1995-1996 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kopp 1994).
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Civil Procedure
section 1167.2, entitled the "Pretrial Rent Deposit Pilot
29

Project.

The Pilot Project seeks to reduce the time in which a residential landlord
may regain possession of his or her rental unit by requiring tenants to comply with certain pre-trial procedures, including the presentation of an offer of
proof at a pre-trial hearing, as well as posting up to two-weeks' rent with the
court, in order that the tenant may receive a trial on the merits."9 Established
for a limited time, the California Legislature seeks responses from the local
municipal courts testing the Pilot Project cases no later than September 30,
1998, and will re-examine the success of the program by December 31,
1998.31
This Article discusses the Pilot Project and compares it with the traditional unlawful detainer system currently in place in all of California's municipal courts. Part II discusses the origin and history of the unlawful detainer system and the way the traditional system operates, including its
structure and design. Part III discusses the Pilot Project, including its background, statutory scheme, and procedural mechanism. Part IV turns to an
empirical study and analysis of the Pilot Project as it compares with the traditional unlawful detainer system in the Los Angeles Municipal Court, Central Civil Division. Part V offers an analysis by this author as to the effectiveness of the Pilot Project in terms of the statutorily stated goals for
success, a determination as to whether it is an improvement over the traditional system, a legal analysis of its impact upon landlord and tenant rights
in California, and suggestions for alternative methods the Legislature may
consider in order to assist California landlords to expeditiously evict abusive
tenants. Part VI concludes that the Pilot Project achieved a statistically significant reduction in time from the filing of the complaint to restoration of
possession of the rental unit (measured to the time the clerk issues a writ of
possession), but fails to satisfy the Legislature's goal of a fifty percent reduction in time.
II. UNLAWFUL DETAINER PROCEDURE:
ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF THE SYSTEM IN CALIFORNIA

At common law, property owners did not need the assistance of the
court in order to evict tenants from their rental units. If a landlord desired to
terminate a tenancy, he was perfectly within his rights to simply forcefully
eject the tenant from the premises. 32 However, as time passed, courts became
29. Ia
30. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1167.2(c)(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
31. Id § 1167.2(a)(2)(F).
32. Under early English common law, a landlord was privileged to force his tenant to
vacate the leased premises, provided the amount of force did not cause death or serious bodily
harm. See ScHOsaNsKI, supra note 4, at 399. Provided the landlord stayed within these limits,
a tenant could not prevail in a civil action for restitution or damages. See idi

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1998

5

California Western Law Review, Vol. 35 [1998], No. 1, Art. 4
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

increasingly concerned with the use of "self-help" by landlords in favor of
maintaining the peace and orderly use of court processes.3 By 1381, the
English Parliamentary process eliminated the "self-help" rule and barred the
use of force by the landlord in effectuating evictions.'
United States jurisdictions have departed from the early English common law rule and have expressly barred the use of self-help by landlords."
Virtually every state currently has an unlawful detainer or forcible detainer
system
for expeditiously evicting tenants through a court-sanctioned proc36
ess.
The California Supreme Court examined the limits of self-help in California in Jordan v. Talbot. 7 In Jordan,the plaintiff leased a rental unit from
the defendant. 38 The lease agreement, signed by both parties, provided for a
"right of re-entry" by the landlord and a lien against personal property in the
event the tenant breached any material covenant or condition in the lease. 9
After the tenant failed to timely pay her rent, the landlord entered her rental
unit, removed her belongings, and refused to permit her to re-enter."° The
landlord did not file any court action for possession.4 '
Following a forcible entry and detainer action by the tenant, the court
awarded damages for her dispossession."2 On appeal, the landlord argued that
he was not liable for forcible entry and detainer because the lease agreement
contained a right of re-entry, he did not use "force" to enter the premises,
and he was privileged to enter the rental unit in order to effect his "lien" on
the tenant's personal possessions inside. 3
The court rejected the landlord's arguments, holding that any provision
in a lease that allows a landlord to enter a rental unit in order to dispossess a
tenant without the resort to court processes is contrary to established public
policy.' "Regardless of who has the right to possession, orderly procedure
and preservation of the peace require that the actual possession shall not be
disturbed except by legal process. '"' The landlord unlawfully resorted to
33. See id
34. See id. at 399-400. Although the use of "self-help" became a violation of criminal
law, the English system did not extend a private cause of action to illegally dispossessed tenants. See id

35. See id.
36. See id However, a minority of jurisdictions will permit self-help evictions, provided
the lease agreement expressly permits it and the landlord uses only reasonable force. But, the
prevailing view declares such provisions void as contrary to modem public policy. See id at
403.
37. 55 Cal. 2d 597, 361 P.2d 20, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1961).

38.
39.
40.
41.

See id
See idat 601.
See id.
See id

42.
43.
44.
45.

See id.
at 602.
See id at 602-03.
See i. at 604-05.
Id at 605.
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self-help when he unlocked the tenant's rental unit without permission and
removed her personal belongings, "even though there was not physical damage to the premises or actual violence."46
The common law doctrine of "self-help" is no longer a tolerable remedy
for a landlord's need for restitution of the rental unit. 7 Forcible and unlawful
detainer statutes in virtually every jurisdiction in the United States, including
California, provide a summary proceeding for landlords to recover possession of their properties and restrict them to such legal processes."'
California enacted the unlawful detainer system in order to provide a
landlord with a summary remedy for evicting a tenant from the rental premises for a violation of a covenant, condition, or restriction in the lease, including non-payment of rent 9 The Legislature has attempted to completely
establish the parameters governing the unlawful detainer action in these
California statutes.'0 The following is a brief description of the process for
this system.
A. Service of Notice
On initiating an unlawful detainer action, the landlord must serve upon
the tenant the requisite notice pursuant to statute."' If the action is based upon
a breach of a curable covenant, the landlord must serve a three-day notice to
cure, perform, pay rent, or quit and deliver up possession of the premises." If
the tenant fails to cure the breach within the three-day period, or, alternatively, if he refuses to vacate the unit by the expiration of that time, a cause
of action in unlawful detainer ripens.53
Alternatively, the landlord may serve either a three-day or thirty-day
notice to quit. Such a notice is not based upon a curable breach of covenant,
and simply demands restitution of the premises. A landlord may serve a
three-day notice to quit where a tenant commits serious waste, causes a sub-

46. Id

47. See Daluiso v. Boone, 71 Cal. 2d 484, 78 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1969). California courts
favor a "judicial adjustment of differences" with respect to resolving issues surrounding rightful possession of land and thus discourage the parties from "redressing or attempting to redress their own wrongs" at the expense of a possible breach of the peace. Id at 495.
48. See ScHoscuNsM, supra note 4, at 408.
49. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
50. See Cambridge v. Webb, 109 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 936, 937, 244 P.2d 505, 506 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1952).
51. There are limited exceptions to this rule. If the tenant is an employee of the landlord,
no notice to terminate the leasehold is typically required, provided the employment contract
clearly indicates the number of days that the tenant/employee has to vacate the unit. See CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161(1). Moreover, if the premises are substantially or completely destroyed, no notice to terminate is required. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1933(4) (West 1982 &
Supp. 1998).
52. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1161 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
53. See id
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stantial nuisance, or employs the rental unit for illegal uses. 5' He may serve a
thirty-day notice to quit at the expiration of a lease term or where the tenancy is based upon a month-to-month term and where he does not wish to
renew or continue the tenancy."
California law requires landlords to serve a three-day or thirty-day notice by one of three ways. First, he should serve the notice by personally delivering it to the tenant.56 If the tenant is not in the rental unit, then the landlord may substitute serve the tenant by leaving the notice with "a person of
suitable age and discretion" and by sending a copy via first-class mail to the
tenant.' If either personal or substitute service cannot be achieved, the
landlord may post the notice on the door of the rental unit and send the tenant a copy by first-class mail. 58 In addition to these three methods of service,
a fourth method, certified or registered mail, is a proper alternative way to
serve a thirty-day notice to quit" Once the notice period expires and the defendant does not cure the breach of covenant and/or vacate the rental unit, a
cause of action in unlawful detainer ripens.'
B. Overview of the TraditionalSystem
Once a cause of action accrues in unlawful detainer, California law
gives the plaintiff standing to proceed with the lawsuit A landlord must file
a complaint, demanding possession of the subject premises.6' .The basis for
the action is usually premised upon the failure to surrender possession following one of the four notices to quit discussed above.62
The landlord must serve a copy of the complaint, along with a five-day
summons, on the tenant.' After receipt of service of the summons and complaint, the tenant may file a demurrer' a motion to strike,65 a motion to
quash, 6 a general denial, or an answerY It is possible for a defendant to file
a motion to quash, followed by a demurrer, and then followed by a general
54. See id- § 1161(4).
55. See id. § 1161(1).
56. See id § 1162.
57. Id Although the statute seems to suggest that this second form of service may only
be used if the tenant cannot be found at either his residence or "usual place of business,"
courts rarely require landlords to first attempt personal service upon the tenant at his workplace.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

64.
65.
66.

67.

See id
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1946 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
Seeid § 1161.
See id § 1166.
See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1167 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
Seeid § 430.10.
See id. §§ 435-437.
See id §§ 418.10, 1167.4.
See id§ 1170.
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denial or answer in order to delay the process and achieve additional time,
even if the ultimate defense is meritless.
Once the tenant ultimately files his answer or general denial, the landlord may then seek a trial setting by filing a Memorandum to Set Case for
Trial." Pretrial procedures are limited,69 and California courts normally do
not set unlawful detainer actions for settlement or trial setting conferences.
The clerk of the court must set the case for trial within twenty days"0 of filing
the Memorandum to Set Case for Trial." Parties are required to receive at
least ten days advance notice of trial.7
Once the case is set for trial, the discovery process may continue. 7"
However, even if the discovery process is incomplete, courts will not ordinarily grant a continuance of the trial! 4 Trial dates are otherwise rarely continued."
Assuming the court enters judgment in favor of the plaintiff landlord, he
or she may then seek enforcement of the judgment by applying for issuance
of a writ of possession from the court clerk. 6 Once receiving the application,
the clerk will verify the entry of judgment for possession and restitution of
the premises and issue the writ. The writ is then presented to the levying
officer for the county (usually the sheriff or marshal), who serves it on the
subject premises. 8 The occupants then have a minimum of five days to vacate the premises before the levying officer may return to force them out. 9
Of course, any occupant may then seek an ex parte order from the court that
issued the judgment and writ of possession for a stay of execution on a vari68. See id § 1170.5(a); see also CAL. Cr. R. §§ 209ff, 507ff (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
69. Discovery is available, but does not alone delay the setting of the trial date. See CAL.
Civ. PROC. CODE § 2024(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
70. This assumes possession of the premises is at issue. See id § 1179a. Otherwise, the
action is not entitled to priority setting and will not necessarily be set within twenty days of
filing the Memorandum to Set Case for Trial. See id.
71. See id § 1170.5. The defendant may file a counter-memorandum within five days of
the filing of the Memorandum to Set Case for Trial in order to request a different date for
trial, to challenge the time estimate, or to request ajury trial. CAL. Or. R. § 507(c). The clerk
must consider the defendant's counter-memorandum. See id
72. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 594(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
73. Full discovery is available to litigants in unlawful detainer actions, though the time
parameters are shorter in recognition of the expedited process. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 16,
§ 8:426; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998). The litigants to an unlawful detainer action may take depositions, propound interrogatories, demand inspection of
documents, and request for admissions. See iU.
74. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, § 8:454. However, a party may be able to receive ex
parte orders to shorten time for processing discovery, especially if the opposing party caused
a delay in the normal discovery process or if the sought after information is shown to be critical to the seeking party's case. See id. §§ 8:459, 9:38.
75. See CAL. Cr. R. § 375(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
76. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§1170.5(a), 1174(c) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
77. See id § 712.010.
78. See id. § 715.020(a).
79. See id § 715.020(c).
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ety of legal and/or equitable grounds."0 Such stays, however, are rarely
granted.
III. PRETRIAL RENT DEPOSIT PILOT PROJECT
A landlord may have the option of electing to proceed through the Pilot
Project Test program in select California courts. The Pilot Project seeks to
provide landlords with a faster system for evicting tenants, provided certain
pre-conditions are met and provided the landlord gives up certain rights.
All of the pre-court processes are exactly the same as those under the
traditional system. The landlord must serve the requisite notice upon the tenant (for Pilot Project cases, a three-day notice to pay rent or quit is the only
applicable one). If the tenant refuses to cure the breach or, alternatively, vacate the premises by the expiration of the notice, then a cause of action in
unlawful detainer ripens.
A. Backgroundof the PilotProject
Hearing many anecdotal stories of how the habitability defense caused
"abuses and delays" in the unlawful detainer process, the California Legislature (primarily through Senator Quentin Kopp) considered and ultimately
enacted legislation aimed at restricting California tenants from frivolously
employing this defense." Senate Bill 690, later codified as California Code
80. The court may stay the execution of the writ of possession while considering the validity of post-trial motions, including one for a new trial, entry of new judgment, or application for relief from forfeiture. See id. § 918.
For discussion on application for relief from forfeiture, see Bruce Zucker, Extreme Hardship
May Undo Court-OrderedEviction, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 6, 1997, at 8.
The court also has the inherent power to temporarily delay execution of the writ of possession
due to hardship. See id
81. Cal. S.B. 690, 1995-1996 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kopp 1994).
The Legislature finds and declares as follows:
(a) The landlord-tenant relationship is unique. Rent may not be accepted by the
owner during the pendency of an unlawful detainer action without a potential
waiver of all of the owner's rights under an eviction notice. Moreover, during the
pendency of unlawful detainer proceedings (1) owners are not allowed to eliminate
any services provided to the tenant with the intent to cause the tenant to vacate the
premises, (2) owners are not excused from making continuing real property tax,
mortgage, mortgage interest, utility, insurance or maintenance payments for the
premises, and (3) owners are not allowed to retake possession by self-help.
(b) Millions of dollars are lost by owners of residential rental property on a recurring annual basis and added to the rent of rent-paying tenants as the result of uncollectible unlawful detainer judgments and the delays inherent in the state's unlawful detainer system.
(c) Approximately 220,000 unlawful detainer cases are filed annually in the state,
involving less than 5 percent of the state's rental units, costing millions of dollars
in attorneys' fees and court costs, and unnecessarily burdening the court admini-
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of Civil Procedure section 1167.2, created an alternate eviction system in
certain California municipal courts" that became known as the Pretrial Rent
Deposit Pilot Project." This statute does not appear to be thoroughly thought
through by its authors; as discussed and illustrated below, its wording has
ambiguities and it contains provisions that appear internally inconsistent."
The implementing statute 5 for the Pilot Project enumerates the objectives that the Legislature seeks to achieve.86 First and foremost, the Legislature anticipates that cases proceeding through this system will effect a fifty
percent time reduction as measured from the point the landlord files the unlawful detainer complaint to the moment the court issues the writ of possession.' Additionally, no more than five percent of tenants who lose their
cases should be filing notices of appeals,88 and no more than one percent of
the rental units should have outstanding health department, building and
safety, or other such regulatory agency citations. 9 Second, the Legislature
does not wish to burden the courts with the processing and administration of
this new eviction system." As a measurement, it declared that the cost of its
operation should not exceed that of the conventional system and that the
"total administrative and judicial time" for processing these new cases
should be reduced by 40%.91 Finally, the Legislature wishes to ensure that
"due process protections are maintained for all parties,"92 although it did not
explicitly define what it meant by this statement.
The Legislature does not appear to expect that each and every one of the
above listed criteria will be achieved. "Failure to meet one or more of the
numerical measurements of success shall not be interpreted as a lack of success of the project, if, in the Judicial Councils' view, the totality of circum-

stration and taxpayers.
(d) It is the intent of the Legislature in establishing a statewide rent deposit project
to mitigate the delays and revenue losses in the current unlawful detainer process
by requiring deposit with the court of unpaid prospective rent for the period from
the date of the commencement of the unlawful detainer action to the date of the
anticipated trial.
Id
82. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1167.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
83. Melissa Cordish, Preliminary Report on the Pretrial Rent Deposit Pilot Program in
the Los Angeles Municipal Court Central Civil Division 4 (May 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
84. See, e.g., infranote 130.
85. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1167.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
86. Id § 1167.2(a)(1).
87. Id.
88. Id § 1167.2(a)(1)(A).
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id §
Iad §
Iad §
Idt §

1167.2(a)(1)(B).
1167.2(a)(1)(E).
1167.2(a)(1).
1167.2(a)(1)(D).
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93

B. The Statutory Scheme
At the time of this writing, various California municipal courts were
testing the Pilot Project 4 In such areas, landlords may choose to prosecute
an unlawful detainer action through either the Pilot Project or through the
traditional unlawful detainer method.95
There are several differences between the Pilot Project and the traditional unlawful detainer systems. The requirement that a pre-trial hearing be
held prior to the tenant receiving a trial on the merits is the primary difference between them.96
Should the landlord elect to proceed through the Pilot Project system, he
must first satisfy several procedural prerequisites. First, the landlord must
affirm under penalty of perjury that the rental unit at issue does not have any
health, safety, fire, rent control, or other local agency citations outstanding.'
If so, the landlord may not proceed through the Pilot Project system.9 If discovered during the pendency of the action, the unlawful detainer is subject to
dismissal.9
Besides ensuring the court that the unit has no outstanding health or
safety citations, the landlord may only proceed through the Pilot Project
system if the cause of action is based upon a holdover following service and
expiration of a three-day notice to pay rent or quit ' The landlord may not
use this system to prosecute actions based upon other causes of actions, such
as breaches of covenants other than to pay rent or for holdover tenants following the service and expiration of a thirty-day notice to quit'
Once the complaint is filed, a "reply form" is attached to the tenant's
copy of the filed complaint." After service of the complaint and reply form,
the tenant may use it as one method to respond to the unlawful detainer." 3
The reason for the creation of the reply form is to allow a tenant who wishes
93. Id § 1167.2(a)(1).
94. As of January 1, 1997, the Pilot Project included courts located in Los Angeles, San
Bernardino, Riverside, Santa Maria, El Cajon, and Downey. However, "nothing shall preclude other municipal courts [in California] from opting to implement the pilot project." Id
95. See id § 1167.2(b)(1). "The plaintiff may make a demand for a pretrial prospective
rent deposit. .. ." Id (emphasis added) (implying that the plaintiff is not required to do so).

96. See idt § 1167.2(b)(3).
97. See id § 1167.2(b)(1). Apparently, the Legislature wants to ensure that so-called

"slumlords" do not avail themselves of this expeditious system. Moreover, by definition, a
unit with any outstanding health and safety citation has likely breached the implied warranty
of habitability, thus raising the likelihood of a defense judgment.

98. See id
99. See id § 1167.2(c)(1).
100. See id
101. See id.
102. Id § 1167.2(b)(2).
103. See id
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to defend the action to notify both the landlord and the court that he or she
"denies the allegations" in the complaint and wishes to be present at the
mandatory pretrial hearing. 4
There are two ways the tenant may file the reply form. First, he may go
to the courthouse and personally file it with the court clerk.' 5 In the alternative, within five days of service of the complaint, he may send it to the clerk
by certified mail.' Regardless of whether the clerk has received the reply
form from the tenant, the court will set the case for a pretrial hearing to occur within eight to thirteen days after the landlord has filed the proof of
service for the complaint.
Besides returning the reply form to the court, the tenant may alternatively choose to file an answer or a general denial.' As a practical matter,
this will be sufficient to ensure the tenant has entered an appearance in the
action. However, if the tenant does not return the reply form to the court
within the five-day period or otherwise formally respond to the complaint,
he or she may have to post a prospective rent deposit" 9 with the court clerk
prior to (or on the day of) the hearing."' Otherwise, the tenant risks losing
his right to receiving a trial on the merits."' If the tenant does not timely file
the reply form or other responsive pleading within the five-day statutory period, or post the rent prior to (or on the day of) the hearing, the court will
have the authority to summarily grant judgment in favor of the landlord at
the pretrial hearing without giving the tenant any additional opportunity to
defend the action."'
Following a pretrial hearing, the court may elect to set the case for trial
on the same day."' However, the court may only do so if the notice of the

pretrial hearing sent to the parties reflects the fact that the court may set the
case for trial on the same day,"5 and the tenant must be provided the opportunity to have an attorney present for the trial." 6 The tenant may not waive
the requirement of notice and opportunity to procure counsel for a trial oc-

104. Id.
105. Seeid § 1167.2(b)(2)(A).
106. See id

107. Seeid § 1167.2(b)(3).
108. See id § 1167.2(c)(3).
109. "Prospective renf' is defined as receipt of up to 15 days rent, but not exceeding
$500. "Prospective rent" is calculated pro rata and is based upon the lowest amount of rent
charged during the prior six-month period. See id § 1167.2(e).
110. The rent deposit must be made in the form of cash, cashier's check, or money order.

See id.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See id § 1167.2(b)(2)(B).
See id
See id § 1167.2(b)(2)(C).
Seeid § 1167.2(b)(3).
Seeid.
See id § 1167.2(c)(4).
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curring on the same day as a pretrial hearing."' The tenant may be present
and advance his legal position in opposition to the landlord's presentation at
the pretrial hearing, provided he either returned the "reply form" within the
statutorily mandated time parameters or posted the rent deposit prior to, or
on the day of, the pretrial hearing."
The pretrial hearing is supposed to be "informal," such that the goal of it
is to "dispense justice promptly, fairly, and inexpensively."''. As a practical
matter, the rules governing the presentation and admissibility of evidence are
often relaxed, much like those that govern during a small claims court trial.'20
As a general rule, attorneys are not permitted to represent their clients at this

pretrial hearing.'
The primary function of the pretrial hearing is for the court to make a
determination as to whether the landlord has pled a prima facie case evidencing a cause of action in unlawful detainer and whether the tenant has
any basis, along with supporting evidence, for defending the action. As
part of this determination, the court will hear testimony as to whether the
plaintiff is the landlord of the rental unit, whether the defendant failed to
tender the rent described in the three-day notice, whether the defendant was
served with the notice according to methods of service set forth in California
Code of Civil Procedure section 1162," whether the defendant held-over
following expiration of that notice, and whether a "substantial conflict" exists between the parties.' After evaluating all of the testimony and other information submitted by the landlord and tenant, the court will rule as to
117. See id
118. In practice, some courts permit tenants to participate in the pretrial hearing even if
they have failed to file a formal response prior to the hearing or posting of rent. See generally
Cordish, Preliminary Report on the Pretrial Rent Deposit Pilot Program in Los Angeles Municipal Court Central Civil Division, supra note 83.
119. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1167.2(c)(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
120. See id § 116.510 ("The hearing and disposition of the small claims action shall be
informal, the object being to dispense justice promptly, fairly, and inexpensively."). See also
Houghtaling v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1128, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855 (1993) (stating
the rules of evidence and the presentation of cases are relaxed in California small claims
courts).
121.
[N]o attorney may take part in the conduct of the pretrial hearing unless the attorney is appearing to maintain an action by or against himself or herself, by or
against a partnership in which he or she is a general partner and in which all partners are attorneys, or by a corporation. If any attorney appears at the pretrial hearing to maintain an action [in one of these three circumstances], an attorney may
appear for the opposing party ....
CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1167.2(c)(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998). However, an attorney may
appear to represent either a landlord or a tenant at the pretrial hearing if a motion or demuner
is presented. Id. § 1167.2(c)(3).
122. Seeid § 1167.2(c)(2).
123. See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
124. A "substantial conflice' exists when material issues of fact need to be determined at
trial. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1167.2(c)(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol35/iss1/4

14

Zucker: California Pretrial Rent Deposit Pilot Project: A Legal and Empir
1998]

CALIFORNIA PRETRIAL RENT DEPOSIT PILOT PROJECT

173

whether the tenant will be ordered to deposit prospective rent with the court
in order to receive a trial on the merits.'25
If the court determines that the landlord has met his burden and that the
tenant is not likely to prevail at trial, the court must order that the tenant deposit rent with the court if he wishes to receive a trial. 2 6 The court must give
the tenant two court days following the pretrial hearing to post the deposit,
provided an answer or reply form was timely filed with the court.'" If the
tenant failed to file a response to the action, the court should order him to
post the rent deposit on the same day as the pretrial hearing.'28 If the tenant
does not post that day, the court has the authority to enter judgment in favor
of the landlord without further notice or proceedings. 9
Regardless of whether the tenant timely filed a response to the action, he
may still file one at the pretrial hearing.'30 Just like the traditional system, the
tenant may file any of the statutorily authorized responsive pleadings, including a motion to strike, a demurrer, a general denial, or an answer.'3'
However, unlike the traditional system, the responsive pleading may be oral
or written.' If the tenant files an oral response, the court clerk must somehow reduce it to writing.'33 Any motion or demurrer that the tenant elects to
file must be heard and ruled upon at the pretrial hearing."M
Although the general statutory scheme of the Pilot Project discourages
the use of lawyers (and specifically prohibits their presence during most
pretrial hearings), attorneys may appear at the hearing in order to present a
motion or demurrer on behalf of a tenant, or to respond to a motion or demurrer on behalf of a landlord.'35 Otherwise, attorneys may not participate
during the pretrial hearing phase.'36
125. See id.
126. Id. § 1167.2(c). The court must determine "whether a substantial conflict exists as
to a material fact or facts relevant to the unlawful detainer" in order to require the defendant
to post prospective rent to obtain a trial. Id
127. See id § 1167.2(c)(1).
128. See id
129. See id. As a practical matter, courts participating in the Pilot Project permit tenants
up to two days to post the pretrial rent deposit if they attend the hearing, regardless of whether
they timely filed a reply or answer to the complaint.
130. See id § 1167.2(c)(3). This subsection seems incongruous with subsection
(b)(2)(B), which requires the defendant to file the reply form with the court, and at the same
time, tender a rent deposit no later than the date for the pretrial hearing. Failure to comply
with the latter subsection appears to require the court to then render judgment in the plaintiff's
favor. See iL § 1167.2(b)(2)(B). It appears that these two subsections may be reconciled by
interpreting them as mandating the defendant to tender a rent deposit prior to the time of the
hearing if the defendant wishes to formally respond to the complaint, unless the tenant has
already filed a reply form.

131. See id § 1167.2(c)(1).
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Seeid.
See id.
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During the pretrial hearing, the court must make a determination as to
whether there is a "substantial conflict" between the landlord and tenant" 7 If
one does not exist, the tenant must post a rent deposit in order to receive a
trial.' If there is a substantial conflict, or if the tenant posts rent, the court
will set the case for trial. 39
The main determination at trial will most likely focus on whether the
landlord breached the implied warranty of habitability, thus mandating that
the rent deposit (if previously posted) be returned to the tenant. 4 Of course,
any other defenses that the tenant may prove to undermine the cause of action in unlawful detainer, such as the landlord's lack of standing, premature
filing of the complaint, overstatement of the amount due in the three-day
notice, improper service of the notice, or any other similar such defenses,
should also result in a defense judgment and require a return of the rent deposit. 4'
Following trial on the merits, if the trial court determines that the landlord breached the implied warranty of habitability,4 ' it will require that the
rent deposit be returned to the tenant, provided that certain other conditions
are satisfied.'43 The tenant need not pay any past rent due under the three-day
notice. The tenant must only pay the reduced amount of rent from the trial
date until the corrections of the deficiencies are made.'"
On the other hand, should the tenant fail to prevail at trial, the court will
release the rent deposit to the landlord. Any subsequent action for unpaid
rent by the landlord must account for the rent deposit released to the landlord, and the court hearing the damages action must do a set-off as part of
the judgment."'
The statutory scheme of Code of Civil Procedure section 1167.2 is not a
model of clarity. There are several ambiguities and self-contradictions contained within the statute. However, to date, no appellate case law has
emerged in order to interpret and clarify some of the provisions contained
within the statute.

137. Id § 1167.2(c)(2).
138. See id § 1167.2(c)(1).
139. See id

140. See id § 1167.2(f).

141. See generally id § 1167.2(g).
142. Seeid § 1167.2(f).
143. See id
144. See id
145. See id § 1167.2(g). If the landlord prevails at the pretrial hearing, he may only receive a judgment for possession. The court may not award damages. See id § 1167.2(c)(4).
However, if the case proceeds to trial, the court may award damages as well as restitution of
the subject premises. See id.
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IV. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY: COMPARISON OF THE TWO SYSTEMS
A. Study Methodology
To compare the Pilot Project with the traditional unlawful detainer system, we examined data from the Los Angeles Municipal Court, Central Civil
Division (LAMC). Of all of the California courts where the Pilot Project is
currently tested, LAMC draws the largest number of unlawful detainer ilings within its venue.
The LAMC clerk's office is responsible for accepting filings of the unlawful detainer complaints for both traditional and Pilot Project unlawful
detainer actions. The clerk separates the two types of cases in its case numbering system by assigning the letter designation "P" to the Pilot Project
cases and the letter designation "U" to the traditional cases. The remainder
of the case number is determined by the year of the filing (i.e., "97") and the
sequential number of the filing (i.e., "00123"). Therefore, the 123rd traditional unlawful detainer case filed in this court in 1997 receives the case
number "97U00123," while the 123rd Pilot Project case receives the case
number "97P00123."
We limited our inquiry to the populations of "P" and "U" cases filed in
the 1997 calendar year. During 1997, the LAMC clerk accepted 347 P-cases
and approximately 30,850 U-cases for filing. Because the population size of
the Pilot Project cases was relatively small, we decided to code and collect
data on each of the 347 P-cases for this study. To compare them with the Ucases, we took approximately one percent of the approximately 30,850 total
U-cases as our sample size. This amounted to examining 400 U-cases at random.
As discussed above, the Legislature set forth three primary criteria for
measuring the success of the Pilot Project. For the first criterion, the Legislature seeks a fifty percent decrease in time from the filing of the complaint
to regaining of possession; less than five percent of the cases should be appealed by a losing tenant; and less than one percent of the rental units at issue in the court action should have outstanding habitability violations at the
time the complaint was filed. 4 ' The second criterion calls for "significant
administrative burdens ...not [to be] imposed upon the courts." 47 The total
cost of processing Pilot Project cases must be equal to or less than the total
cost for processing traditional unlawful detainer cases. 4 ' For the third criterion, the Legislature wants to ensure that "due process protections" are
maintained for both the landlord and the tenant. Specifically, this new system should not adversely effect the parties' abilities to "prepare and present
a case" at the hearing.'49 Notwithstanding these goals, if the Pilot Project
146.
147.
148.
149.

See id. § 1167.2(a)(1).
Id
See id § 1167.2(a)(1)(D).
Id
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fails to meet all of the criteria discussed above, the Legislature may nevertheless deem it "successful" if the "totality of the circumstances" indicate the
Pilot Project is a good system. 50
B. Specifics of the Study and Summary ofFindings
For purposes of our study, we focused on the first criterion set forth by
the Legislature; that is, an examination of the speed, the number of appeals,
and the number of outstanding health violations compared between the two
systems. In addition, we also measured other factors, including a comparison
of the number of attorneys representing each party, the average rent amounts
and number of pure non-payment cases proceeding through each system, the
number of tenants who default, and the number of tenants qualifying for
waivers of court fees.
1. Summary ofPilotProjectFindings
With respect to the Pilot Project cases, tenants filed some form of a
formal response in 142 cases (40.9%). Tenants filed reply cards in eighty
seven cases (25.4%); they filed some other form of responsive pleading (either a general denial or answer) in sixty eight cases (19.6%); and they fied
both a reply and either an answer or general denial in thirteen cases (3.8%).
Of the 347 active P-cases, 308 cases (88.8%) were set for pretrial hearings. Defendants failed to appear for pretrial hearings in 179 cases (51.6%).
Of the remaining cases where the tenant appeared for the pretrial hearing,
fifty-one cases (14.7%) were set for trial. Of that number, twenty-five cases
(49.0% of pre-trial hearings) required the tenant to post a rent deposit as a
prerequisite to receiving a trial on the merits. Three trials (5.9% of total trials) were held the same day as the pretrial hearing.
Out of the 347 P-cases, 33 cases (9.5%) were abandoned by the landlord
at some point during the court process and prior to the rendering of a judgment; 57 cases (16.4%) were dismissed either voluntarily by the landlord or
involuntarily by the court (due to lack of prosecution); and the remaining
257 cases (74.1%) went to final judgment' In terms of attorney representation, sixty-eight cases (19.6%) had an attorney represent the landlord at
some point during the process, while only four cases (1.2%) had an attorney
represent the tenant.
We identified only one case with outstanding health citations. This resulted in a judgment in favor of the defendant. Only seven total cases resulted in judgments for defendants, which represents 2.0% of the 347 cases
and 2.7% of the 257 judgments entered. The remaining 250 judgments
150. Id. § 1167.2(a)(1). ,
151. At the time of this writing, four cases were still pending. Each appears to have been
abandoned by the landlord.
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(97.3%) were entered in favor of the landlord. We found only one Pilot Project case that was appealed (.3%). See Table 1.

Table 1
Pilot Project - Summary of Findings
P-Cases (n=347)
Variable
Responses
Reply
Answers/General Denials
Any Response

Cases

%

87
68
174

25.4
19.6
50.1

179

51.6

IFPs (Fee Waivers)

83

23.9

Trials

51

14.7

Judgments Entered
For Plaintiff
For Defendant

257
250
7

74.1
97.3'
2.7"

Writs Issued

188

54.2

1

0.3

Abandonments

33

9.5

Dismissals

57

16.4

308

88.8

25

49.0"

1

0.3

Defaults

Appeals

Pretrial Hearings Scheduled
Rent Deposits
Ordered
Health Citations

Attorney Representation
Plaintiff
68
19.6
Defendant
4
1.2
Represents percentage of judgments entered.
Represents percentage of cases set for trial on condition of posting rent deposit out of
total number of trials.

2. Summary of TraditionalSystem Findings
With respect to the traditional system, we sampled 400 U-cases at random out of a total of approximately 30,850 cases filed in the 1997 calendar
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year, which represented 1.3% of the total population of cases. Of the 400
cases sampled, tenants filed a formal response in 165 cases (41.3%). Tenants
defaulted in another 165 cases (41.3%). Landlords abandoned 26 cases
(6.5%) and filed voluntary dismissals in 69 cases (17.3%). Attorneys represented landlords in 290 cases (72.5%). On the other hand, attorneys represented tenants in only eleven cases (2.8%).
Of the 400 U-cases sampled, 147 went to trial (36.8%). However, the
court issued judgments in 305 cases (76.3%)." The court entered judgment
in the landlord's favor in 300 cases (98.4% of total judgments), while it entered judgment in the tenant's favor in only 5 cases (1.6% of total judgments).
Of the 300 cases that went to judgment in favor of the landlord, the
court issued 254 writs of possession, representing 84.7% of total landlord
judgments. We found only two cases that were appealed by losing tenants
(.5%). See Table 2.

Table 2
Traditional System - Summary of Findings
U-Cases (n=400)
Variable
Responses (Answers)

Cases
165

%
41.3

Defaults

165

41.3

IFP's (Fee Waivers)

140

35.0

Trials

147

36.8

Judgments Entered
For Plaintiff
For Defendant

305
300
5

76.3
98.4
1.6'

Writs Issued

254

63.5

2

0.5

Abandonments

26

6.5

Dismissals

69

17.3

290
11

72.5
2.8

Appeals

Attorney Representation
Plaintiff
Defendant
Represents percentage of total judgments entered.

152. This figure includes default judgments.
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3. ComparisonBetween PilotProjectand TraditionalSystem
Following a summarization of the data, we compared several different
variables between the two systems. The most crucial variable comparison
involves the relative time from filing of the complaint to the issuance of the
writ of possession. However, we also examined and reported the results of
the comparisons between the number of outstanding health violations, the
number of appeals, defaults, attorney involvement, fee waivers (IFP's),
rental amounts, and the number of judgments entered and writs issued. The
following tables summarize the results and the results are further discussed
in the brief narrative that follows.

Variable

Table 3
Summary of Comparisons
(Traditional System vs. Pilot Project)
U-Cases & P-Cases (n=747)
Decreases
U-Cases
P-Cases
% Change

Complaint to Judgment

34.2 days

27 days

-21.1

Complaint to Writ Issuance

38.7 days

33 days

-14.8

Trials

36.8 %

14.7%

-22.1

Attorney Representation (Plaintiff)

72.5%

19.6%

-52.9

Writ Issuances

63.5%

54.2%

-9.3

EFPs (Fee Waivers)

35.0%

23.9%

-11.1

Increases
Defaults
No Meaningful Difference

U-Cases
41.3%

P-Cases
51.6%

% Change
10.3

U-Cases

P-Cases

Appeals

0.3%

0.5%

0.2

Attorney Representation (Defendant)

2.8%

1.2%

-1.6

98.4%

97.3%

-1.1

1.6%

2.0%

0.4

76.3%

74.1%

-2.2

6.5%

9.5%

17.3%

16.4%

Judgments Entered (Plaintiff)
Judgments Entered (Defendant)
Judgments Entered (Plaintiff or Defendant)
Abandonments
Dismissals
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Table 4
Rental Values - Summary of Comparisons
(Traditional System vs. Pilot Project)
Variable

U-Cases

Monthly Rental Amounts (mean)

P-Cases

% Change

$509.34

$501.51

-2.0

74.4%
2.3%

100.0%

25.6
_

Types of Cases
3-day pay or quit
3-day perform or quit

-

3-day to quit

2.3%

-

30-day to quit

2.3%

-

-

11.6%

-

-

7.1%

-

-

§1161a foreclosure
Other

Table 5
Estimated Regression Coefficients
Dependent Variable: Days From Filing
Complaint to Issuance of Writ of Possession
(Traditional System vs. Pilot Project)
U-Cases & P-Cases (N=--440)
Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

Intercept
(t-statistic)

38.73
(27.16)"

33.96
(19.83)"

34.70
(10.01).

Pilot Project

-5.74
(-2.63)'

-2.57
(-1.15)

-2.71
(-1.18)

11.55
(4.78)"

10.87
(2.95)'
-.80
(-0.24)

Trial
Default
N=
Adjusted R2

440

440

440

.0133

.06015

.05813

F-Statistic

6.9247

15.050

10.031

" Statistically significant at 1%level
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Table 6
Time From Filing Complaint to Writ Issuance
(Best and Worst within the Two Systems)
P-Cases (n=347) U-Cases (n=400)
Fastest 20 cases
P-Cases U-Cases

Slowest 20 cases
P-Cases U-Cases

Time
(Days)

Time
(Days)

Time
(Days)

Time
(Days)

a. Time
The most telling portion of the study involved measuring the average
processing time from the filing of the complaint to the entry of judgment and
issuance of the writ of possession. As previously discussed, the Legislature
seeks to reduce the "abuses and delays" inherent in the unlawful detainer
system. By reducing the time frame and life span for an unlawful detainer
action by fifty percent, the Legislature could consider the project at least
partially successful.
The 1997 Pilot Project, or P-cases, had an average processing time from
filing of the complaint to entry of judgment of 27.0 days, compared to the
traditional, or U-cases, of 34.2 days. When we looked at the time from complaint to issuance of the writ of possession, the P-cases had an average time
of 33.0 days, compared to the U-cases having an average time of 38.7 days.
These figures represent an average reduction in time of 21.1% and 14.8%,
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respectively. See Table 3.
We also looked at twenty "fastest" and twenty "slowest" cases of the
population of P-cases and of the sample of U-cases by measuring the amount
of time that elapsed from complaint to judgment in each. In terms of the
slowest or "worst" cases, only one P-case out of the total population exceeded a 90-day life span-lasting 165 days from complaint to judgment.
Only fourteen P-cases out of the total population exceeded a sixty-day life
span. On the other hand, seven U-cases out of our one-percent sample exceeded a 90-day life-span. One case lasted 271 days from complaint to
judgment. Nineteen U-cases of the sample lasted seventy or more days. See
Table 6.
As far as the fastest cases are concerned, the 'P"and "U" system tied
with processing at least one case from complaint to judgment in nine days.
The "P" system processed fifteen cases out of the total population in fourteen days or less. The "U" system processed eight cases out of the sample in
fourteen days or less. See Table 6.
It should be noted that each of the fastest cases cited above (the nineday total elapsed time) involved situations where the tenant did not file a responsive pleading or otherwise defend the action (defaulted). Moreover, in
terms of the slowest cases in each of the two systems, there is no evidence in
either of those cases that tenants abusively filed motions or invoked other
delay tactics to cause the slow down. With respect to the P-case with the
165-day time lapse, the court issued a conditional judgment whereby the
tenant won the right to remain in possession provided certain conditions
were satisfied. By the time the default occurred, several months had elapsed.
Presumably, the landlord received rent payments in the interim---otherwise,
the default would have occurred earlier, thereby permitting the landlord to
obtain a writ of possession more quickly. With respect to the U-case with the
271-day time lapse, the tenant did not respond to the lawsuit, and judgment
was entered following default. The landlord was not represented by counsel,
so presumably this delay was attributed to some anomalous situation.
b. OutstandingHealth Violations
The next factor we examined involved the number of rental units that
appeared to have outstanding health and safety violations. The ability to
measure this criterion was difficult because the court judgments did not consistently reflect the court's findings on this issue. However, we concluded
that the court entertaining a Pilot Project case reasonably would not award
judgment in favor of the landlord if an outstanding health or safety citation
existed at the time the complaint was filed. Therefore, we looked for cases
where the tenant prevailed in the action as a possible indicator of an outstanding health violation.
This was not hard to do because only seven Pilot Project cases resulted
in defense judgments. Of these cases, the court did not identify an outstand-
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ing health violation in any of the case files, with the possible exception of
one.153 In order to stay within the statutorily stated parameters, less than onepercent of the cases, or 3.5 total cases, should not have any such violations.
It appears, at most, only one of the Pilot Project cases in 1997 had such a
violation, which is below the one percent mark.
With respect to the traditional cases, we were unable to determine with
any measure of accuracy the number of cases that had outstanding health
violations. Unlike the Pilot Project cases, a landlord is not precluded from
proceeding through the traditional system even if the subject premises has
such an outstanding violation at the time the unlawful detainer complaint is
filed. However, very few U-cases resulted in defense judgments, only five
cases out of our sample size of 400 (1.6%). Therefore, the likelihood of a
significant number of U-cases having outstanding health violations is small.
c. Appeals
The Legislature declared that no more than five percent of Pilot Project
cases should be appealed in order for it to be deemed successful. " With respect to the P-cases, we only found one case 55 where a tenant filed a notice
of appeal from a final judgment. On September 9, 1998, the Appellate Department of the Los Angeles County Superior Court dismissed it, apparently
due to the tenant's failure to pursue the appeal. However, we also examined
the number of U-cases where a tenant appealed a final judgment. In the sample we examined, only two tenants filed notices of appeals. At the time of
this writing, both of the appeals'56 were abandoned by the tenants. Therefore,
in terms of the number of notices of appeals filed by losing tenants, there is
virtually no difference between the two systems. Moreover, the number of
cases appealed in the Pilot Project system is well under the statutorily-stated
limit of five percent.

153. Of the seven Los Angeles Municipal Court P-cases that resulted in defense judgments, four did not identify the reason for the court deciding in the tenants' favor. L.A. Mun.
Ct. Case Nos. 97P188; 97P201; 97P243; and 97P254. A fifth case (L.A. Mun. Ct. Case No.
97P173) resulted in a defense judgment due to the landlord failing to properly register the
rental unit with the Los Angeles Housing Department, Division of Rent Stabilization (See Los
Angeles Municipal Code § 151.05, mandating landlords to register their rental units located
within the City of Los Angeles and constructed prior to 1978 with the city's housing department. Otherwise, the landlord may not levy or collect rent from his tenant. Such a situation
negates the validity of a three-day notice, obligating the court to summarily enter judgment in
favor of the tenant.) A sixth case (L.A. Mun. Ct. Case No. 97P122) noted that the landlord
failed to provide proper evidence for service of the three-day notice to pay rent or quit. A seventh case (L.A. Mun. Ct. Case No. 97P182) noted that the three-day notice to pay rent or quit
was "defective." Further investigation into this file seemed to suggest that the landlord had
previously been cited by a building, safety, or health agency for dilapidated conditions in the
rental unit, thus rendering the three-day notice to pay or quit "defective."
154. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
155. L.A- Mun. Ct. Case No. 97P332.
156. L.A. Mun. Ct. Case Nos. 97U06035 and 97U14247.
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d. Defaults
We next looked at the number of tenants who defaulted in their eviction
cases and compared them between the two systems. For the "U" sample, we
only looked at the total number of tenants who failed to file responsive
pleadings to the complaint. We did not include in our study the total number
of tenants who filed responses to the complaints but who failed to attend the
court trial.
For the "P" sample, we considered that a tenant defaulted if he or she
failed to attend the pretrial hearing. The reason for using this criteria is due
to the fact that the Pilot Project requires a pretrial hearing held irrespective
of whether a tenant files a reply or answer to the complaint.'"7
Tenants defaulted in U-cases at a rate of 41.3% (165 total cases). This is
compared to a 51.6% default rate in the P-cases (179 total cases).
However, for the P-cases, we also measured the number of tenants who
filed a responsive pleading (either a reply or an answer), the number who
filed a responsive pleading and failed to attend the hearing, the number who
did not file a responsive pleading but attended the hearing, and the number
of tenants who did not either file a responsive pleading or attend the hearing.
The results were quite interesting. Tenants responded in some form
50.1% of the time (174 cases), which would include filing a reply, an answer, a general denial, a pre-hearing motion, or by simply showing up at the
pretrial hearing without previously filing any paperwork. They filed reply
forms 25.4% of the time (87 cases); answers or general denials 19.6% of the
time (68 cases); answer/general denial and a reply form 3.8% of the time (13
cases); and attended the hearing without filing paperwork in advance 9.2%
of the time (32 cases). Only 11.8% of the time (41 cases) did tenants file either a reply, an answer, or both, and later fail to show for the pretrial hearing.
e. Attorney Involvement
Next, we measured the frequency of attorney representation in each of
the two systems. We hypothesized that the number of attorneys involved in
the pilot project system should be significantly less than the traditional system, given the legislative restriction on attorney participation.
Our results were indicative of this restriction. In the U-cases, we found
that attorneys represented landlords in 290 cases (72.5%) and tenants in 11
cases (2.8%). In contrast, the P-cases only resulted in attorney representation
of landlords in 68 cases (19.6%) and tenants in 4 cases (1.2%). This is a
change of 52.9% and 1.6%, respectively.
f

In Forma Pauperis(Fee Waivers)

In Forma Pauperisor "IFP" is a signal that the court grants a litigant a
157.

See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1167.2(b)(3) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
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waiver of court fees and costs because he or she falls below certain income
threshold limits and therefore should be considered "low-income." We compared the number of IFP litigants who proceeded through each process to see
if tenants from low-income rental units were increasingly being exposed to
the Pilot Project system.
We found that 23.9% of tenants in the Pilot Project cases qualified for
fee waivers. In the U-cases, 35.0% of tenants qualified.)' This represents a
change of 11.1%.
g. Rental Values and Nonpayment Cases
Next, we compared the differences in rental values and types of cases
between the two systems. In order to do this, we randomly sampled 37 cases
of the total population of Pilot Project cases (representing a sample size of
10.7%) and looked for monthly rental amounts, pretrial rent demands, and
types of cases filed. We found that the average monthly rental amount was
$501.51, and the average pretrial rent deposit demand was $201.00. By design, all of the Pilot Project cases involved non-payment of rent issues
premised upon a three-day notice to pay rent or quit Our sample did not reveal any commercial tenancy cases.
In contrast, we randomly sampled 43 cases of the original group of 400
U-cases. For each sample, we recorded the total monthly rent amount as well
as the type of case involved. We determined that the average monthly rental
value was $509.34."' With respect to the types of cases filed, 74.4% were
nonpayment of rent cases premised upon a three-day notice to pay rent or
quit. The remaining 25.6% consisted of section 1161a foreclosure evictions
(11.6%),6' thirty-day notice to quit (2.3%), three-day notice to cure breach
of covenant or quit (2.3%), three-day notice to quit (2.3%), employment related evictions (2.3%), and commercial non-payment (4.7%).
From these figures, we compared the average rental amounts stemming

158. It should be noted that a tenant may proceed through the Pilot Project system without being required to remit an appearance fee. The clerk does not charge tenants for filing a
"reply" card, which ensures them of their right to at least a pretrial hearing. It is possible for
the tenant to remit an oral answer or denial at the hearing, and ultimately defend the entire
action without ever filing a single document, which would require the tenant to pay a filing
fee. This is not true for the traditional system. Tenants must file a responsive pleading in the
traditional system in order to ensure their right to a trial or any other court hearing. Therefore,
percentages of tenants in the Pilot Project cases that would have otherwise filed fee waiver
applications would actually be higher.
159. Of the 43 cases we sampled, 35 involved residential tenancies and two involved
commercial tenancies. The two commercial tenancies had monthly rental amounts of $2,790
and $1,600. We eliminated those two from our sample in order to arrive at the $509.34 figure.
Without eliminating them, the average monthly rent amount is $600A6. The remaining five
involved California Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a post-foreclosure eviction actions,
which are not premised upon landlord-tenant relationships. Therefore, they do not have rental
amounts at issue.
160. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161a (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
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from each system. The difference was slight, only a $7.83 difference between the two systems. However, it is interesting to see that the Pilot Project
cases, however slight, on average involved less expensive rental amounts.
See Table 4.
h. Entry of Judgments and Issuance of Writs
Another criterion that we measured involved the number of judgments
that resulted in favor of either party. We hypothesized that the ultimate outcome of the case on the merits should not be affected by which system the
landlord opted to use. However, we wanted to determine whether the court
judgments would be affected by proceeding through either system. We
measured the number of P- and U-cases resulting in judgments for landlords
and for tenants.
The results were very close. In the '" system, 74.1% of the Pilot Project cases (257 total cases) went to judgment, compared to 76.3% of the traditional cases (305), a difference of 2.2%. In the "P" system, 97.3% of the
cases that went to judgment resulted in judgments in favor of the landlord,
compared to 2.7% in favor of the tenant. In the "U" system, 98.4% of the
cases that went to judgment were entered in favor of the landlord, compared
to 1.6% in favor of the tenant.
With respect to issuance of the writ of possession, the difference was
actually much greater. After the judgment is entered in favor of the landlord,
a writ of possession is needed if the tenant still remains in possession. In the
Pilot Project cases, the court clerk issued a writ of possession 54.2% of the
time (188 of total cases). In contrast, the traditional system resulted in writ
issuances 63.5% of the time (254 of total cases). This represents a 9.3% reduction of writs issued in Pilot Project cases.
C. Regression Analysis of the Time Variable
The most critical component to the unlawful detainer process involves
summary adjudication of the relevant issues. The faster the landlord can
evict a tenant, the greater the reduction in costs of unpaid rent. In order to
determine whether the Pilot Project is accomplishing its primary goal, that
is, reducing the time involved such that a landlord may regain possession of
his rental unit, we analyzed the relative time between the filing of the complaint to the issuance of the writ of possession in each of the two systems.
In order to statistically analyze our data to test the integrity of the results
of the time variable, we conducted a multiple regression... using 440 obser-

161. Multiple regression analysis is a procedure used to help the observer understand
how one variable (the dependent variable) is influenced concurrently by a number of other
variables (the independent variables). See EARL BABBIE, THE PRACtiCE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH
439 (1992).
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vations 62 between the two systems and reported the results in Table 5. As
our dependent variable, we used the number of days that elapsed from filing
of the complaint to issuance of the writ of possession. As our independent
variables, we examined (1) whether the variable was a P- or U-case, (2)
whether a trial occurred, and (3) whether a default judgment had been entered. The purpose of this regression analysis was to test whether the 5.74
day (14.8%) reduction in time from complaint to writ issuance in the Pilot
Project is due to the design and structure of the system itself, or if it is due to
some other independent variable.
The coefficient on the Pilot Project shown in regression (1) of Table 5
indicates that Pilot Project cases take an average of 5.74 fewer days and is
statically significant at the one percent (1%) level. When additional explanatory variables for trials and defaults are included, the coefficient on the
Pilot Project falls to 2.57 and 2.71 days, respectively, and is no longer statistically significant. In regressions (2) and (3), the coefficient on trials indicate
that the occurrence of a court trial increases the number of days by 11.55 and
10.87, respectively, significant at the one percent (1%) level in both regressions. The coefficient on default judgments in regression (3) is small, not
statistically significant, and adds to the estimation of number of days.
The results of regressions (2) and (3) suggest that about one-half of the
approximate six-day average reduction in time achieved by the Pilot Project
over the traditional system may be attributed to the fact that the Pilot Project
produces overall fewer trials, and the occurrence of a trial adds to the number of days of the lifespan of an unlawful detainer. However, to the extent
the Pilot Project helps produce fewer trials, the total reduction of 5.74 days
for the Pilot Project cases found in regression (1) correctly measures the impact of the new system in reducing the number of days from filing of the
complaint to the issuance of the writ of possession. Further research will be
necessary to help clarify the role of court trials in this dynamic and its impact on the Pilot Project.
V. EVALUATION OF THE PILOT PROJECT AND SUGGESTIONS FOR
ALTERNATIVE PROCESSES

A. Evaluationof the PilotProject
The Pretrial Rent Deposit Pilot Project emerged as the Legislature's response to the seemingly growing complexities, problems, and delays caused
by the traditional unlawful detainer system in California."7The Legislature
believes that landlords in California collectively lose millions of dollars each
162. We started with the total population of P-cases (347) and the total sample of Ucases (400), or 747 cases altogether. From those cases, we eliminated any case that did not
result in the issuance of a writ of possession. This left us with 440 total cases between the two
systems to use for the multiple regression analysis.
163. See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
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year in unpaid rent, attorneys' fees, court costs, and other collateral damage
resulting from a tenant's failure to pay rent and a tenant's delay of an inevitable eviction by abusing the court process." More specifically, the Legislature pointed the blame at the semblance of an overburdened unlawful detainer system that appeared to take an increasingly longer period of time to
effectuate an eviction."
In order to seek to reduce the amount of time necessary to evict a tenant,
the Legislature established the Pretrial Rent Deposit Pilot Project, seeking a
fifty percent reduction from the time a landlord filed a complaint for unlawful detainer until judgment was entered and possession was restored.'66 Based
upon our study of the Pilot Project, this goal was not accomplished."s
The Los Angeles Municipal Court, which processed over 30,000 unlawful detainer actions through the traditional system in 1997 in its downtown
courthouse alone, had a mean processing time, from filing of the complaint
to issuance of the writ of possession, of 38.7 days. On the other hand, it
processed the 347 total Pilot Project cases in that same year in an average of
33 days. Although a statistically significant reduction of almost six days, this
amounts to only a 14.8% reduction in time, not a 50% reduction in time as
hoped by the Legislature.
Another objective criteria that the Legislature set as a goal for achieving
success for the Pilot Project is insignificant. The Legislature sought that less
than five percent of Pilot Project cases should be appealed. 68 Although less
than one percent of Pilot Project cases were appealed (only one person appealed his loss, which is .3 percent of all Pilot Project cases), the traditional
unlawful detainer system had virtually no cases appealed either. In our sample, only two traditional system cases were appealed, which is .5 percent.
Finally, the Legislature set a goal for less than one percent of the Pilot
Project cases to have outstanding violations 69 Our study revealed only one
Pilot Project case that appeared to have an outstanding health violation. On
the other hand, the traditional cases may not have had very many either, perhaps less than one percent as well. As discussed above, we were unable to
definitively make this determination. Nonetheless, there was virtually no difference between the two systems considering these two criteria alone.
The most significant measure of success turns on whether "due process"
protections for tenants are maintained through the implementation of the Pilot Project eviction system. 7 This criterion is very vague, nebulous, and
amorphous. The "due process" rights for tenants are already very limited in

164. See id
165. See id
166. See id

167. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.a.
168. See supranote 88 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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the existing unlawful detainer system. 1" A system such as the Pilot Project,
which only serves to further narrow a tenant's procedural fights, cannot be
said to "maintain" due process protections. To the contrary, the Pilot Project
seeks to limit attorney representation, alter the manner in which a tenant responds to the complaint, and severely limits the tenant from having the ability to have a trial on the merits.
Besides the statistical failure of the Pilot Project, the design of the system has inherent problems. For example, commentators have noted that indigent tenants, "who often have barely enough money for rent, food, clothing, and other necessities each month, that have paid rent to the landlord2
may not have enough funds to make anotherpayment of rent to the court.?M
Although in practice, tenants may wait until the pretrial hearing before rent
must be posted and thus have an opportunity to contest this requirement, the
statutory design of the system nevertheless mandates a posting of rent prior
to (and as a condition of receiving) a pretrial hearing.
Even with the 14.8% reduction in time that the Pilot Project achieved in
1997, it is important to note that the traditional system processed over
30,000 cases in that same year, compared to only 347 cases for the Pilot
Project. The traditional system therefore handled eighty-five times more
cases during that year. If the Legislature replaced the traditional system with
the Pilot Project, it is unclear whether the courthouse administration would
be able to process the Pilot Project cases and achieve that same time reduction. Every case would be set for a pretrial hearing, which would no doubt
impose a significant burden upon the court's ability to process unlawful detainer actions.
For all of the reasons discussed above, a system such as the Pilot Project, requiring a pretrial hearing and/or a pretrial rent deposit as a condition to
receiving a trial on the merits, causes significant procedural problems upon
the courts and upon the parties themselves. All of the judicial energy and resources required to administrate this new system may not be worth the
14.8% reduction in time that appears to have been achieved.
B. Proposalsfor Alternative Systems
Based upon this Article's assessment of the Pilot Project discussed
above, it would be an imprudent decision for the California Legislature to
171. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
172. Gerchick, supra note 24, at 848.
173. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1167.2(b)(2)(C) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998). Notwithstanding this statutory requirement, the Los Angeles Municipal Court nevertheless permits
tenants to appear at the pretrial hearing without having first posted a pretrial rent deposit. At
the hearing, the tenant may seek a waiver of the posting requirement by, among other things,
providing evidence to the court that the rent amount at issue had previously been paid. However, not all courts in California necessarily follow the Los Angeles Municipal Court's interpretation and implementation of this statutory provision. Therefore, it remains unclear how
other courts in California testing the Pilot Project deal with this issue.
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implement it on any large scale. Certainly, if the traditional system was replaced with one such as the Pilot Project system for all unlawful detainer actions, the courts would become so over-burdened with pretrial hearings that
it would only serve to worsen the problem and fall well below the status quo.
However, there does remain the concern that landlords need access to a
summary eviction system that processes unlawful detainer actions in an expedited manner. The problems that have been presented in terms of delay
tactics of the tenant seem to be the exception rather than the rule. 74 However, in lieu of eliminating the traditional system (or even adding a rentdeposit system such as the Pilot Project), better alternatives have been proposed and should be explored.'7 5 Five of them are discussed below.
1. Alternative DisputeResolution
Various methods of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) have increasingly materialized over the last several years as ways for promoting a
prompt, efficient, and fiscally preferable manner for reducing or eliminating
litigation. Those promoting ADR have advanced several obvious and favorable factors for its use over traditional litigation systems: (1) faster dispositions; (2) less costly in terms of time and money; (3) less burdensome on the
courts; (4) increased efficiency by using arbitrators or mediators with specialization in the particular area of law as opposed to court judges who must
be generalists; and (5) actual compromises and settlements that are more
likely to mirror the desires of the parties.'76
Unlike other forms of civil litigation in California, the unlawful detainer
system is presently void of any provision mandating landlords and tenants to
participate in some form of alternative dispute resolution, such as judicial
arbitration or mediation.' However, landlords may include provisions in
rental agreements which may mandate disputes surrounding alleged breaches
of the implied warranty of habitability be submitted to arbitration."'7 Such an
174. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.a.
175. See generally Gerchick, supra note 24, at 846-58.
176. See JANE P. MALLOR, BuSINEsS LAW AND THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 32

(1997).

177. In ordinary civil litigation, courts may require the parties to participate in nonbinding arbitration as part of the pretrial process in certain types of civil actions. See CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.11. (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
178. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998). Section 1942.1 provides,
in pertinent part:
The lessor and lessee, may, if an agreement is in writing .. . provide that any controversy relating to a condition of the premises claimed to make them untenantable
may by application of either party be submitted to arbitration, pursuant to the provision of Title 9 (commencing with Section 1280, Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure), and that the cost of such arbitration shall be apportioned by the arbitrator
between the parties.
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agreement does not violate public policy normally suspect when any waiver
of procedural rights is involved in a residential tenancy. " 9
As a practical matter, arbitration over residential tenancy disputes is futile unless the tenant truly has the ability to pay rent and is not merely invoking the habitability defense as a delay tactic. Unless an arbitrator's decision is binding, unreviewable, and immediately enforceable, such as
providing the landlord with the ability to seek and obtain an enforceable writ
of possession to oust the tenant from the rental unit in a speedy fashion, it
behooves a landlord to choose this process. Although much of the technical
court procedure of judicial unlawful detainer actions would be effectively
eliminated and the substantive issues would be processed in a streamline
manner, there is always the strong possibility that the tenant will not comply
with the arbitrator's decision, or even with the decision reached between the
parties. On the other hand, legislative action mandating binding and unreviewable arbitration risks only further depriving tenants of their already limited procedural rights in unlawful detainer actions.'
Notwithstanding many of the positive aspects alternative dispute resolution brings to the civil procedural system in California, in its present form,
it may not solve landlords' concerns regarding speedy resolution of cases involving non-payment of rent. Perhaps the Legislature can test an ADR process that would work in tandem with the current unlawful detainer system.
For example, with appropriate legislation, courts could set some amount
(say, ten percent) of all unlawful detainer filings for mandatory judicial nonbinding arbitration/settlement conference within five days of the filing of the
tenant's responsive pleading. Local bar associations can (and currently do)
offer volunteer attorneys to serve as arbitrators and mediators.' These neutral individuals could meet with the parties at the prescheduled conference in
order to work towards a resolution of the dispute. Any settlement or stipulation could then be acted upon that day by the law and motion judge or, for
those courts with direct calendaring systems, by the judge assigned to that
particular case. If the arbitrator or mediator could not resolve the case, no
time is lost for the landlord. However, for those contested cases that are resolved, landlords (and tenants) receive some sort of tolerable compromise of
their case and the court system is alleviated of some congestion. By using
volunteer attorneys, there should be very little (if any) additional cost involved for its implementation.

179. See id § 1953. However, having such a provision may backfire on the landlord. At
least one court has upheld the validity of an arbitration clause in a commercial lease agreement where the tenant sought a stay of the unlawful detainer action pending the outcome of
the arbitration. See Mleynek v. Headquarters, 165 Cal. App. 3d 1133, 209 Cal. Rptr. 593
(1984).
180. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 1141.10 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
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2. Increased Court Sanctions, Statutory Damages, or CriminalPenalties
for FrivolouslyInvoked Defenses
Under current law, a landlord may seek punitive or statutory damages in
an unlawful detainer action where the landlord proves the tenant acts with
"malice" in his refusal to relinquish possession of the rental unit.' In order
to support an action for punitive or statutory damages, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant acted with malice in exercising his decision
to holdover and in creating the action for unlawful detainer.' If proven, the
plaintiff may be entitled to an award of actual damages or punitive damages
up to three times the unpaid rent." If the landlord properly pleads and
proves "malice" on the part of the tenant, the plaintiff "may be awarded
statutory damages of up to $600, in addition to actual damages, including
rent found due." '85
There are two problems with this current sanction. First, a possible $600
sanction provides very little (if any) incentive for the judgment-proof tenant
to avoid engaging in delay-tactic behavior. Moreover, regardless of the
amount of the potential sanction, a tenant who does not have the fiscal ability or financial resources to timely vacate the rental unit will not do so.
A second problem with this statutory damages provision lies with the
potential danger for further delay of the unlawful detainer complaint. Plaintiffs must sufficiently plead a cause of action for statutory damages on the
face of the complaint."6 Otherwise, stating mere "conclusory allegations of
malice" in order to invoke this provision may subject the complaint to a demurrer by the tenant, leading to a substantial delay of the eviction action."
Notwithstanding the current California punitive or statutory damages
provision, the Legislature could easily enact new legislation to empower the
courts to impose severe civil sanctions or empower the government to seek
criminal penalties against those few tenants who severely abuse the defense
process. 8 For example, some states have enacted statutes criminalizing behavior whereby a tenant who remains in possession "without justification" is
deemed 89
"stealing" a landlord's rental services, thus committing a misdemeanor.1
182. Id § 1174(b).
183. See id
184. "If the defendant is found guilty of forcible entry, or forcible or unlawful detainer,
and malice is shown, the plaintiff may be awarded either damages and rent found due or punitive damages in an amount which does not exceed three times the amount of damages and
rent found due." CAL. Civ. PROC.CODE § 1174(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
185. Id.
186. See Roth v. Morton's Chef Services, Inc., 173 Cal. App. 3d 380, 218 Cal. Rptr. 684
(1985). Plaintiff must allege and prove defendant's "continued possession is malicious," entitling him to punitive damages. Id at 388.
187. See MosKovrrz, supra note 5, § 13.29.
188. See discussion supra Part IV.B,3.a.
189. Gerchick, supra note 24, at 847-48.
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However, imposing civil sanctions or criminal penalties may be risky.
Certainly, tenants should not be discouraged from zealously defending their
legal rights to remain in possession of their rental units. As long as the tenant
in good faith pleads recognized defenses supported by some semblance of
authenticity, he should not be sanctioned, even if the result is delay in the
process. Prosecutors, responding to pressures from local landlord lobbies,
could resort to pursuing actions against tenants perceived to be frivolously
delaying the eviction but who actually are exercising their due process
rights. Perhaps a clearly authored and sufficiently detailed criminal statute
could give the government the teeth it needs to criminalize the extreme
situations, yet at the same time ensure that no tenant gets prosecuted for
raising good faith defenses to the eviction suit."'
3. Vexatious Unlawful DetainerLitigantStatute
Some tenants repeatedly abuse the court eviction system to delay an inevitable eviction. A way to control this problem may be through invoking a
"vexatious unlawful detainer litigant" statute, modeled after California's
vexatious litigant statute which declares any individual who brings five unsuccessful lawsuits without having attorney representation in a seven-year
period a "vexatious litigant."'9 Such an individual may be required to post a

bond in order to proceed with subsequent lawsuits.'92
However, California's "vexatious litigant" statute is only targeted at
plaintiffs in ordinary civil actions. A California "vexatious unlawful detainer
litigant" statute could have similar language as the former, but target certain
problem tenants. This new statute could mandate that any tenant who has a
history of unsuccessfully defending unlawful detainer actions over a particular time period and who invokes various procedural delay devices must
obtain court approval prior to using the discovery process, issuing subpoenas, or filing motions. For example, a tenant who wishes to serve interrogatories on the plaintiff may do so, unless the plaintiff seeks to have the tenant
declared a "vexatious unlawful detainer litigant" as a result of the tenant
having the requisite number of prior unsuccessful defenses to unlawful detainer actions and where each of those prior actions involved procedural maneuvers calculated at delaying the action.
The "vexatious unlawful detainer litigant" statute could read as follows:
Any individual who enters an appearance in at least three unlawful detainer actions in this state in a three-year period that ultimately result in
adverse judgments against him and where he repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery,
or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause
unnecessary delay is a "vexatious unlawful detainer litigant." In any un190. See id at 848.
191. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 391 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
192. See id. § 391.1.
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lawful detainer action pending in any court of this state, a plaintiff may
move the court, upon five-days notice and hearing, for an order requiring
the defendant to seek leave of court prior to using the discovery process,
issuing subpoenas, or filing any motions. The motion must be based upon
the ground, and supported by a showing, that the defendant is a vexatious
unlawful detainer litigant and that there is not a reasonable probability that
he will prevail in the unlawful detainer action against the moving plaintiff.
The defendant, upon ex parte application, may obtain leave of court to use
the discovery process, issue subpoenas, or file motions.
Attorneys representing landlords could utilize one of several eviction
reporting services'93 to determine whether the tenant has the necessary prior
unlawful detainer cases in order to have him declared a vexatious unlawful
detainer litigant Of course, given that the timeframe of unlawful detainer
actions is so short, any motion to have the defendant declared a "vexatious
unlawful detainer litigant" must happen quickly, and usually at the outset of
the action. Otherwise, the vexatious tenant could successfully delay the process.

Although this proposal seems rather harsh, in practice, very few tenants
will fall within the definition of the proposed statute. As concluded in the resuits of the empirical study above,'94 very few tenants truly employ delay
tactics to abuse the system. Therefore, the use of a "vexatious unlawful detainer litigant" statute should be the anomaly, rather than the rule.
4. Restitution Fund
Another possible alternative to help minimize losses associated with
problem tenants involves the establishment of a restitution fund aimed at
providing partial compensation to those small and relatively low-income
landlords who experience difficulty or are otherwise unable to financially
survive a tenant frivolously delaying an eviction. The idea of a restitution
fund is not new, and it actually comes from the criminal justice system and
the California Victims of Crime Program.' Under the Victims of Crime
Program, any California resident who detrimentally suffers a "pecuniary
loss" as a victim of a crime may be eligible to apply for benefits. 9 ' Any person convicted of a crime in the State of California may be ordered to pay a
"restitution fine" for deposit into the Restitution Fund in the State Treasury
193. California has several credit reporting agencies that provide landlords with information on individuals who have been parties to unlawful detainer actions. These agencies
may report inforation about any individual who was a party to such an action, even ifhe ultimately prevailed in the lawsuit. See U.D. Registry, Inc. v. California, 34 Cal. App. 4th 107,

40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 777 (1996).
194. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.a.
195. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 13959 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998). "It is in the public interest to indemnify and assist in the rehabilitation of those residents of the State of California
who as the direct result of a crime suffer a pecuniary loss which they are unable to recoup
without suffering serious financial hardship." Id

196. Id
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for the purpose of funding the Victims of Crime Program. 97 The State Board
of Control administers this program and uses the "restitution fines" for the
purpose of indemnifying other victims of crime. 9 '
California could implement a program for the unlawful detainer system
very similar to the Victims of Crime Program discussed above. The court
clerk can assess a $2 to $3 special assessment, over and above the current
$94 to $101 filing fee for unlawful detainer actions, to go into a special restitution fund.'99 For example, in the area covered by the Los Angeles Municipal Court alone, over 30,000 unlawful detainer actions are fied each
year,2"0 which would result in raising $60,000 to $90,000 annually. The court
could administer a "Victims of Abusive Tenants" fund, whereby low-income
landlords could file an application for reimbursement for losses that directly
result from such problem tenants.
Although the amount available in the fund would be very small compared to the total number of filings each year, this study concluded that even
the traditional unlawful detainer system processes cases in a relatively timely
fashion. It appears to be the anomaly where a landlord is truly victimized by
a tenant who raises frivolous defenses to delay the action. Therefore, the
number of claims against the proposed fund should not be enormous.
Moreover, criteria could be established to further minimize the number of
landlords who would qualify for reimbursement, thus ensuring that those
landlords most in need and/or those landlords most victimized actually receive money from the fund.
5. PrioritySetting for LandlordHardship:The "Small LandlordRemedy"
Although any landlord endures a heavy burden when he must resort to
the court system to evict a non-paying tenant, small-scale landlord operations (such as the individual who owns and lives in one unit of a duplex and
leases the other to a renter) may experience an even greater burden than
larger property management companies. 'Perhaps the greatest financial and
personal hardship for a landlord occurs when delays and costs of the eviction
process
force the landlord to lose her property to a mortgage or tax foreclo20 1
sure.
The idea of the need for a "small landlord remedy" has previously been
proposed in order to assist the "hardship landlord" by extending "priority
over nonhardship landlords in setting a trial date, serving the notice to va197. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 13967 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
198. Id
199. To file an unlawful detainer complaint for demands up to $10,000, the fee is $94.
For demands in excess of $10,000, the filing fee is $101. See Coordinated Procedural Rules
for Municipal Courts of Los Angeles County (Fee Schedule), Southern California Court
Rules, Daily Journal.
200. See discussion supraPart IV.B.
201. Gerchick, supra note 24, at 853.
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cate, and conducting the eviction."2' Although the usual statutory time parameters for notice would remain,"3 these actions could receive priority over
other pending unlawful detainer cases.
Like the restitution fund, this proposal "could only be extended to a
small proportion of landlords" because of the nature of having such a priority system.' Nevertheless, it may be a viable option to help alleviate one of
concerns of the Legislature when it implemented the Pilot
the articulated
20 5
Project.
VI. CONCLUSION

For the latter portion of the twentieth century, California law has restricted a landlord's ability to freely evict tenants from his rental units. After
the elimination of "self-help" evictions and the advent of court process and
the unlawful detainer system, the courts and Legislature have implemented
additional procedural mechanisms to protect tenants' property interests in
their rental units. As tenants increasingly availed themselves to these protections, the time frame for a judicial eviction proceeding increased, resulting in
increased costs and lost profits to California's landlords.
The California Legislature reacted to pressure from landlord lobby
groups to alter the method by which an unlawful detainer action should proceed by implementing the Pretrial Rent Deposit Pilot Project in order to accelerate the court eviction process. However, as this study showed, the Pilot
Project failed to achieve the primary goal that the Legislature intended, that
is, a fifty percent reduction in time from filing of the complaint to restoration
of possession. Rather, only a 14.8% reduction was achieved. Although statistically significant, the traditional system proved to have been working
satisfactorily all along, with a 38.7 day average processing time from filing
of the complaint to the issuance of the writ of possession. This is only about
five days longer than the thirty-three day average processing time for Pilot
Project cases.
Rather than implement a system such as the Pilot Project, perhaps the
Legislature should focus on more constructive alternatives, such as alternative dispute resolution, sanctions and/or criminal penalties for those few tenants who do abuse the eviction process, a restitution fund that certain abused
landlords may access in order to remedy their losses, or expedited hearings
for certain small landlords who may face extreme hardship unless their court
eviction case is processed in an ultra-speedy manner.
The Pilot Project has a "sunset date" of December 31, 1998, at which
time the Legislature will determine whether to continue it. From this
202.
203.
204.
205.

Ia
See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
Gerchick, supra note 24, at 853.
See id
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author's study and experience, it seems that the traditional system is perfectly capable of handling court evictions in California in a very timely
fashion.
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